Abstract -In 1991, a property tax limitation measure was imposed in fi ve Illinois counties. Dye and McGuire (1997) 
INTRODUCTION

I
n July 1991, Illinois enacted a limit on the growth rate of property tax revenues for some, but not all, local jurisdictions in the Chicago metropolitan area. The "tax cap," as it is known in Illinois, initially affected municipalities, school districts and other types of local governments in the fi ve metropolitan "collar" counties, but not those in the central metropolitan county of Cook.
1 Dye and McGuire (1997) exploit this "natural experiment" to fi nesse some of the econometric diffi culties in earlier studies of property tax limitations and fi nd that the limitation measure effectively constrained the growth rate of property taxes in the fi rst three years of the limit.
2 Dye and McGuire (1997) could only speculate about the longer-term effects of the limit. In this paper, we explore whether property tax limitations become more binding over time. Dye and McGuire (1997) venture that the long-run effects of the limit could be stronger or weaker than the short-run effects. A limit that applies to the growth rate of property taxes could become more binding over time because the easy means of accommodating the cap may become exhausted after the fi rst few years. In addition, the impact of such a limit may compound over time because the revenue base to which the growth limit applies is lower in each future year than it might otherwise have been. On the other hand, with time, local officials might devise means for circumventing the state-imposed limit. There is some evidence, for example, that local offi cials in Arizona circumvented that state's property tax limit in part by shifting to forms of property taxation not subject to the limit (see Fisher and Gade (1991) ). Also, the extraordinarily large number of local jurisdictions in Illinois is often attributed to Illinois' much older property tax rate limit-creating a new local government was one means of circumventing that limit.
In this paper, we estimate the effects of the Illinois property tax limitation measure after many more years of experience and after many more jurisdictions have been brought under its purview. The collar-county jurisdictions have now been subject to the tax cap for over ten years. In the spring of 1995, following a non-binding referendum favoring the cap in Cook County, the Illinois legislature extended the tax cap to Cook County. In the spring of 1996, enabling legislation was passed allowing voters in the remaining 96 counties in Illinois to approve by countywide referenda imposition of the limit on their non-home-rule local governments. As of September 2003, local jurisdictions in 39 counties in Illinois were subject to the tax cap. Thus, the treatment and control groups have changed over time, and in all but the six-county metropolitan area, the tax cap is endogenously chosen by the county voters. This local-option policy selection complicates the econometrics of estimating the impact of the cap. Addressing the problem of endogenous policy change is an important concern of the present paper.
We estimate the effect of the tax cap using a statewide sample of municipalities and a statewide sample of school districts in Illinois. 3 We ask two related questions: (1) is the tax cap effective; and (2) is the tax cap more binding over time? Our answer to the fi rst question is yes; the tax cap appears to slow the growth of municipal and school property taxes and the growth of school expenditures. For property taxes, our answer to the second question is yes; the cap appears to have a larger impact for municipalities and school districts subject to the cap throughout the nine-year period of analysis relative to those with fewer years of experience under the cap. For school expenditures, there does not seem to be a difference between the short-run and long-run effects of the cap.
DATA AND SPECIFICATION
The property tax extension limitation law, as it is formally named, or tax cap, as it is more commonly known, limits the growth in total property tax collections of a local government to a price infl ation factor. There are exceptions for newly developed property in its fi rst year on the rolls, for debt service for obligations incurred before the imposition of the cap, and for override by special referendum. The tax cap is imposed on all local governments in designated counties, 4 with the exception of home-rule jurisdictions.
5
All municipalities and school districts in Illinois for which data are available over the sample period are included. Special rules are in place to designate whether local governments that cross the border between capped and uncapped counties are subject to the cap. 5 All of the local governments in the state of Illinois with home-rule status are municipalities, with the sole exception that the county government in Cook County has home-rule powers. 6 This is nearly the entire population of municipalities and school districts. Excluded are the small number of cases with missing data, values of zero for property tax collections, or growth rates of greater than 100 percent or less than negative 50 percent, (which probably result from the assignment of taxes or expenditures to the wrong year).
Even though other types of government, such as townships and library districts, are also subject to the cap, we focus on municipalities and school districts because together they are responsible for raising over three-quarters of total property taxes (Illinois Department of Revenue, 2002) . Table 1 indicates the number of counties and the associated number of "treatment" municipalities and school districts made subject to the cap in different years, as well as the number of "control" jurisdictions with home-rule status or located in never-capped counties. In 1991, all 144 school districts and 112 non-home-rule municipalities in the fi ve heavily populated suburban collar counties were made subject to the cap, with 113 collar-county municipalities exempt because of their home-rule powers. In 1995, the cap was extended to another 144 school districts and 54 non-home-run municipalities in the central metropolitan county of Cook, with the city of Chicago and 15 other home-rule municipalities in Cook County exempt. Eighteen counties had successful referenda to impose the cap on their school districts and non-home-rule municipalities in 1997, the fi rst year of the local option, and four or fewer additional counties voted to impose the cap in each of the subsequent years. The capped-by-referendum and never-capped counties are scattered around the state; there is little in the way of obvious characteristics to distinguish them.
Outside the six Chicago-area counties, the imposition of the cap follows a countywide vote of residents in jurisdictions that would be subject to the cap. Even though the vote is countywide rather than jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, it may not be appropriate to treat the tax cap as exogenous in these jurisdictions for at least two reasons. First, there may be an omitted factor or set of factors that is a co-determinant of both property tax growth rates and whether voters elect to impose the cap. For example, there may be a taste for or against local government that we do not measure. Second, it may be that past growth of property taxes infl uences voters and is correlated with future growth of property taxes.
To control for omitted co-determinants of property tax growth rates and tax cap status, we employ fi xed effects estimation. The implicit assumption is that the unob- Notes: Counts of the number of counties are included for reference purposes. Counts of home-rule municipalities and never-capped jurisdictions are included to indicate the numbers in the control group. Since our sample period ends in 1999, jurisdictions subject to the cap in later years are treated as never capped. Also, home-rule status can change from year to year, so the sample counts may differ slightly from what is shown here. served heterogeneity does not vary over time, which seems reasonable given our relatively short panel and the nature of the suspected unobserved local preferences. We consider the fi xed effects estimator as our base specifi cation. To test the robustness of the model and to address other potential sources of endogeneity of the tax cap variable, we estimate the equation using both an instrumental variables model and a matching estimator technique.
Each regression includes a full set of yearly dummy variables to capture statewide changes in economic conditions and relevant policies over time. We also include a dummy variable for the "window" year-the year immediately after a county has voted to impose tax caps, but before the caps are in effect-which arguably provides an incentive to increase property taxes. With a fi xed effects specifi cation, the possible additional control variables are limited to those that vary over time. We include a variable for the residential share of total property value (equalized assessed value or EAV) to capture the possibility that heavily residential jurisdictions might be more, or less, willing to increase property taxes than jurisdictions with a greater share of commercial and industrial property. For the municipal tax growth regressions only, we include a dummy variable for home-rule status to capture the notion that home-rule status municipalities have access to a broader array of revenue sources and, thus, may not put as much pressure on the property tax. Finally, for the school tax and expenditure growth regressions, we include a measure of the growth in the number of pupils (the change in the log of "average daily attendance") to capture the fact that state aid and other school budget elements are strongly linked to pupil counts.
RESULTS
In Tables 2 and 3 , we report the results of a fi xed effects estimation of the impact of the tax cap on four separate dependent variables of interest: municipal property tax growth rates (Table 2) , school district property tax growth rates (Table  2) , school district operating expenditure growth rates (Table 3) , and school district instructional expenditure growth rates (Table 3) . 7 Our interest in the latter two variables stems from Dye and McGuire's (1997) fi nding that the tax cap had a signifi cant short-run effect on operating expenditures, which includes instructional, administrative and support services, but no short-run effect on instructional expenditures. The authors interpreted these fi nding as being consistent with a bureaucratic model of local government behavior in which any excess spending by bureaucrats would likely appear in the categories of administrative and support services. In addition, McGuire (1999) argues that any effect of a limitation that provides for overrides can be interpreted as evidence for the bureaucratic model. If, instead, the median voter model were operative, a binding cap would be overridden by the voters and the limit would have no effect. Because political processes are not perfect, it may take several years for the voters to succeed in overriding the limit. Thus, to shed light on whether local government behavior is more consistent with the bureaucratic model or the median voter model, as well as to examine the ability of local governments to absorb the cumulative effect of limits on growth rates, it is necessary to analyze long-run results.
For each dependent variable, the tables present the results of estimating two regressions that differ only in their treat- The fi rst specifi cation does not distinguish how long the cap has been in place. The coeffi cient on the tax cap variable in Table 2 , specifi cation 1 indicates that property taxes grew 3.34 percentage points slower in municipalities that were subject to the cap compared to municipalities that were never hit with the cap. Table 2 , column 3 tells a similar, if more dramatic, tale for school districts. When we turn to Table 3 to examine components of school spending, our results differ from those reported in Dye and McGuire (1997) in that we fi nd that the cap slowed the growth of both operating and instructional spending. These results are not inconsistent. In the short run, school districts may have greater ability to protect instructional spending, but with time the cap may affect instructional spending as well as spending on administration and support staff.
The second specifi cation allows us to address the second question we pose above: is the tax cap more binding over time? We fi nd that the growth rate of property taxes is slowed to a greater extent for municipalities and school districts subject to the cap for four to nine years relative to those subject to the cap for zero to three years. In Table 2 , column 2, for example, the tax cap slowed municipal property tax growth by 2.88 percent in the fi rst three years, our short run, compared to 5.19 percent after four or more years in place, our long run. (An F-test shown in the bottom row of the table indicates that the difference in the short-run and long-run coeffi cients is signifi cant.) This may refl ect the cumulative nature of a cap on the annual growth rate of revenues.
The results for the two tax cap duration variables in the second specifi cation for school spending reveal a different story. In Table 3 , column 2, school operating spending declined 1.61 percent in years one to three, but only 1.24 percent in years four to nine; however, according to the F-test, these are not significantly different. In Table 3 , column 4, instructional spending grew slower for school districts hit by the cap relative to those never subject to the cap by the same amount (about one and one-quarter percentage points), regardless of how long the cap had been in effect.
ADDITIONAL CONTROL FOR ENDOGENEITY
As noted above, one of our ambitions is to treat carefully the problem of endogenous policy choice. Recall that many of our observations are for jurisdictions that were subjected to the cap after a countywide referendum. Our basic strategy is to address this concern by estimating our equations with a fi xed effects specifi cation (Wooldridge, 2002 , chapter 10), using time-invariant jurisdictional dummy variables to control for omitted variables that may infl uence both revenue growth rates and tax cap status. In this section, we test the robustness of the results and control for other possible sources of endogeneity by employing two different approaches.
To simplify the presentation, we re-estimate only the fi rst specifi cation for each of the four dependent variables.
Our fi rst alternative specifi cation follows Boarnet and Bogart (1996) by using a probit equation to generate a predicted value for tax cap status. The two-stage estimation procedure is a straightforward generalization of our earlier results, using an instrumental variable in place of tax cap status to control for any remaining endogeneity problems. Because the tax cap was exogenously imposed by the state legislature in non-home-rule jurisdictions in the collar counties in 1991 and in Cook County in 1995, for these jurisdictions we use actual tax cap status as the measure of the tax cap variable. For all other jurisdictions (all jurisdictions in the downstate counties), the estimated probit probabilities form the instrument for the tax cap variable.
The fi rst-stage probit regressions are presented in Table 4 . As explanatory variables in the probit equation for municipalities, we have dummy variables for the years in which the downstate counties were allowed to hold referenda on the tax cap, the residential share of EAV, the population in 1990, the per capita income in 1989, and the 1989 poverty rate; identifi cation comes from the latter three variables and from the nonlinearity of the probit model. For the school district equations, the explanatory variables are the referendum-year dummy variables, the residential share of EAV, the change in the log of the average daily attendance (number of pupils), the average daily attendance, and a time-invariant measure of "low income pupils;" identifi cation comes from nonlinearity and the latter two variables. The fi t of the equations is good, with signifi cant t-statistics on at least three of the explanatory variables, and three-quarters of the cases correctly predicted in each equation. Noteworthy results include the fi nding that, in all three equations, jurisdictions with a larger share of residential property in the tax base are more likely to be capped. For municipal taxes, the significant coefficient on the population variable suggests that large cities are more likely to be capped. For school districts, the low-income pupil variable is signifi cant.
The second-stage results are presented in the second row of Table 5 . For comparison purposes, the fi rst row reproduces the results for the tax cap variable (Capped Years 1-9) from the first specification (column 1 or 3) from Tables 2 and 3 . With the exception of the result for municipal tax, in which we fi nd a stronger effect once we instrument for the tax cap, the results are nearly identical to our earlier results, suggesting that the straightforward fi xed effects estimator controls adequately for tax cap endogeneity. 8 We again fi nd that the tax cap signifi cantly reduces the growth rates of taxes and expenditures.
Our final method of controlling for endogeneity is based on the matching estimator. Wooldridge (2002, p. 620) presents an excellent overview. The nonparametric procedure matches each treatment municipality or school district with a weighted average of similar observations from the control group. The estimated probit probabilities form the basis for Table 5 . The similarity of the matching estimator to the results in the rest of the table provides additional support for the conclusion that the fi xed effects estimator controls suffi ciently for endogeneity.
Using three methods of controlling for endogeneity, we fi nd robust results indicating that tax caps reduce property tax growth rates, with an effect that is more pronounced over time. Results indicate that school district spending is also reduced by imposition of the tax cap, but there is no discernable difference between the long-run and short-run effects for either operating or instructional expenditures.
CONCLUSION
Employing an unusual sample of jurisdictions all within the same state in which some jurisdictions are subject to a property tax limitation and others are not, we fi nd strong evidence that the property tax cap in Illinois slowed the growth rate of property taxes for municipalities and schools. The restraining impact of the cap on property taxes was stronger in the long run than in the short run. School expenditures also grew more slowly in districts subject to the cap relative to those not hit by the cap, but the effect of the cap was, if anything, weaker in the long run relative to the short run. We conjecture that the difference in the long-run effect of the cap on taxes as compared to the long-run effect on spending may be due to an infl ux of state aid for school districts in the latter part of the period, which would alleviate pressure to keep spending growth in line with property tax growth. When we examine trends in state aid, we do not fi nd evidence consistent with this hypothesis. State aid to school districts does not appear to increase more in the long run relative to the short run. In contrast to the fi ndings in Dye and McGuire (1997) , we fi nd little difference in the effect of the cap on operating and instructional spending, especially in the long run. One possible explanation is that, once the cap has been in effect for many years, the ability of school districts to protect instructional spending from the effects of the cap is limited.
The fi nding that the cap continues to bind in the long run is consistent with voters preferring to place constraints on their elected offi cials, perhaps because of perceived (or real) bureaucratic waste or indifference. If, instead, the voters felt that state-imposed constraints were taking them away from their preferred public spending outcome, they could vote to override the limits, which the voters in Illinois seldom do. The notion that voters' preferences are refl ected in the decisions of local offi cials is diffi cult to reconcile with our fi ndings.
